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Urban Redevelopment
The Ohio Urban Redevelopment Law, designated here as
Amended Substitute House Bill No. 195, became effective Septem-
ber 29, 1949.1 In its original form H. B. 195 contained a policy sec-
tion which read, in part:
It is hereby found and declared that large areas in the
municipalities of the state have become blighted, -with the
consequent impairment of taxable values upon which, in
large part, municipal revenues depend; that such blighted
areas are detrimental or inimical to the health, safety, morals
or general welfare of the citizens, and to the economic wel-
fare of the municipality; and that in order to improve and
maintain the general character of the municipality, it is
necessary to redevelop or rehabilitate such blighted areas.2
This identifies the positive philosophy of urban redevelopment.
After nearly a quarter century of community planning and of
control of private land use through zoning and regulation of sub-
divisional platting, the nation's over-all problem of urban blight
had become more aggravated than ever. Those police power tech-
niques were useful in bringing about the ordered development of
the newer, growing areas on the urban periphery. In older sec-
tions suffering from social and economic deterioration, however,
zoning, even retroactive zoning,s could do no more than proscribe
undesirable construction and uses. It offered no assurance of re-
habilitation of the depressed areas.
The first major governmental attack of a positive nature upon
urban blight developed in the 1930's with the Federal program of
subsidy for public housing for people of low incomes. Public hous-
ing was tied to slum clearance; the policy pursued entailed the
equivalent retirement of slum dwellings to match the new units. 4
1 Several urban redevelopment bills were introduced in the 1947 regular
session of the General Assembly, but none was enacted. See S.B. 343, H.B.
35 and HB. 253.
2 The bill, as enacted, has no separate policy section.
3 Retroactive zoning would not be valid in Ohio. State ex rel. The Fair-
mount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.. 2d 777 (1941). See gen-
erally Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 CoL. L. REv. 457 (1941). The
conventional zoning theory that to forbid extension or enlargement of non-
conforming uses will tend to effect their gradual elimination has not worked;
generally speaking, non-conforming uses have not been discontinued and in-
ability of owners to improve their buildings has been conducive to blight.
Brown, Urban Redevelopment, 29 B. U. L. REv. 318, 319, 320 (1949); Note 9
U. Or Cm. L. REv. 477 (1942).
4 Section 307 of the Housing Act of 1949 so amended the United States
Housing Act of 1937 as to permit postponement of equivalent elimination.
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Public housing projects have not uncommonly been constructed
on slum-cleared sites. The emphasis, however, has been upon ade-
quate housing and the rehabilitation achieved has been largely
confined to residential slums. Urban redevelopment is a much
broader conception; it embraces rehabilitation of any sort of
blighted area by redevelopment for any appropriate uses.
Unaided private effort has been handicapped in at least two im-
portant respects. In the first place it may be very difficult, if not
impossible, to acquire all of the parcels in a blighted area without
the use of the power of eminent domain. The second difficulty has
been that the cost of land acquisition and clearance is so high in
relation to use value for redevelopment purposes that private ven-
ture capital could not readily be attracted.5
The earlier form of urban redevelopment legislation, beginning
with the New York Act of 1941,6 cleared the first of the two hurdles
just noted. Those pioneer acts provided for the organization of
private redevelopment corporations and either conferred the power
of eminent domain upon such corporations or made provision for
the exercise of the power by a municipality in aid of a redevelop-
ment corporation.7 Both methods of making eminent domain avail-
able have been upheld in other jurisdictions against the objection
that the taking would not be for public purposes.8
These early enactments did not meet the second difficulty we
have noted; they did not provide any means of obviating the dis-
crepancy between the cost of land assembly and clearance on the
one hand and its use value for redevelopment on the other.9 It was
this deficiency which, in 1945, brought about an important shift in
5
"An even greater obstacle to the performance of the job by private
enterprise alone is the circumstance that the blighted land usually has a high
present value because of the income produced from its present intensive use.
As the redevelopment plans and sound theory call for a new, far less in-
tensive use of the land in order to provide more pleasant surroundings and
forestall any future blight, the prospective value of the land after redevelop-
ment will be much lower than its acquisition cost. No private interests are
going voluntarily to assume this loss." Brown, Urban Redevelopment, 29
B. U. L. REv. 318, 321 (1949).
6 N. Y. LAWS OF 1941, c. 892; LAWS or 1942, c. 845, as amended by LAws oF
1943, c. 234.
7See the Comparative Digest of the Principal Provisions of State Urban
Redevelopment Legislation issued by the Federal Housing and Home Finance
Agency as of April 1, 1947, and the May 15, 1948, supplement thereto.
8 Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 M11. 114, 59 N.E. 2d 18 (1945) (first method);
Murray v. La Guardia, 291 N. Y. 320, 52 N.E. 2d 884 (1943), cert. den. 231 U.S.
771 (1944) (second method).
9 It is true that some effort was made to bridge the gap by tax exemp-
tion, as in New York. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, 87 N.E.
2d 541 (N. Y. 1949).
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redevelopment policy. In that year a number of states adopted
legislation which placed responsibility for land assembly and clear-
ance upon local public agencies and left actual redevelopment, with
limited exceptions, to private enterprise. These measures were of
two principal types, classified in terms of the public agency em-
ployed for redevelopment purposes. One type makes use of exist-
ing local housing authorities. The other, and more widely embraced
type, places responsibility for land assembly and clearance upon
the local governing bodies or upon other local public instrumental-
ities such as a land clearance commission under the Illinois pat-
tern.'0 The 1949 Ohio Act which has provoked this commentary
falls in this latter class. At the present time several states have
enabling statutes of both major types, that is, laws providing for
private redevelopment corporations and laws placing responsibility
for land assembly and clearance in the hands of some local public
authority. Some form of urban redevelopment legislation exists in
at least twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia. 1
Statutes of the second class are better adapted to a subsidy policy
calculated to obviate the disparity between the cost of land as-
sembly and clearance and use value for redevelopment. More will
be said about this at a later juncture.
CoNsTIUToxAL QUESTIONS
In test cases conducted in over half the states the constitution-
ality of public housing was uniformly sustained.' 2 With the ex-
ception of Ohio,'3 moreover, tax exemption of public housing prop-
erties was upheld. An obvious distinction between public housing
and urban redevelopment is that the former involves construction,
ownership and operation by a public agency, whereas the prevail-
ing redevelopment pattern contemplates that the actual redevelop-
ment be done by private hands and with private capital. This dif-
ference has not grounded adverse rulings on the constitutionality
of urban redevelopment legislation. In only one instance has a
court of last resort declared an urban redevelopment law uncon-
10 Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act of 1947, ILL. LAws or 1947, p. 1072.
11For citations to statutes see the Comparative Digest cited in note 7,
supra, and Bollens and McCarty, Urban Redevelopment Laws and Action
(Univ. of Calif. Bureau of Pub. Admin., May, 1949). There are two 1949 addi-
tions to the list in Ohio and Oregon. The Oregon measure, reported as H.B.
No. 160, has not been available to the writer. New Jersey and New York have
pertinent constitutional provisions. N. J. CoNsT. oF 1947, Art VIII, § 3, II 1;
N. Y. CoNsT., Art. 18, § 2.
12 For a collection of cases see Notes 172 A.L.R. 966 (1948) and 130 A.L.R.
1069 (1941).
18 Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Thatcher, 140 Ohio St. 38,
42 N.. 2d 437 (1942).
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stitutional and the constitutional infirmity involved in that case
had no bearing on the larger questions involved in the urban re-
development idea. The Supreme Court of Alabama declared an
urban redevelopment law, which applied only to cities of over
300,000 population, as of the next preceding federal census, and
which prospectively denied to housing authorities the power to ac-
quire property for slum clearance or housing projects within a city
to which the statute applied, invalid as a local law not passed with
the formalities required by the constitution. 4 In every other re-
ported case in point urban redevelopment legislation has been up-
held.
The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the grant of the power
of eminent domain to a private redevelopment corporation even
though there was no assured public use after redevelopment as in
public housing.15 The court thought that the very redevelopment
removing blight was a public purpose. A like conclusion was
reached in a New Jersey case. The City of Jersey City, acting with-
in the terms of an enabling statute, provided by ordinance for the
acquisition of land in the city for a redevelopment housing project
and by a separate ordinance for the leasing of the land to the Pru-
dential Insurance Company of America under a lease which com-
mitted the Prudential to build and operate the housing project un-
til the amortization of the cost of the facility to it. It was stipulated
that when amortization was completed title to the improvements
was to vest in the city. On certiorari to review the validity of the
ordinances the charge that the acquisition and letting were for
private purposes was rejected on the theory that to provide hous-
ing in this way to meet the serious housing shortage in the city
was a public purpose.16 A provision in the statute authorizing tax
exemption of the project was also sustained on the public use
theory.
An urban redevelopment law of the same general type as the
Ohio statute has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, one judge dissenting.1'7 The court specifically upheld the
grant of the power of eminent domain for purposes of the statute.
The court met the contention that the redevelopment scheme in-
volved simply a taking of private property from one or more in-
dividuals and transferring it to others with the observation that
"4 City of Birmingham v. Moore, 248 Ala. 422, 27 So. 2d 869 (1946).
15 Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 ]1M. 114, 59 NX.. 2d 18 (1945).
16 Redfern v. Board of Commissioners of Jersey City, 137 N.J.L. 356, 59 A.
2d 641 (1948).
17 Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of The City of Philadelphia, 357
Pa. 329, 54 A. 2d 277 (1949). See also General Development Co. v. City of
Detroit, 322 Mich. 495, 33 N.W. 2d 919 (1948).
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the shift in private ownership so effected was not the object of the
statute but a mere incident to the fundamental purpose of rehabili-
tation; the need for public ownership went no further than the ac-
complishment of land assembly and clearance.
There was another constitutional point of more than local sig-
nificance in this Pennsylvania case. It was contended that there
was an improper delegation of legislative power to the local au-
thorities. The dissenting judge thought this contention well taken.
He thought that the provisions of the act, set out below, 8 devolved
upon the local authorities power to determine what should con-
stitute the very jurisdictional facts (existence of blighted areas)
upon the basis of which redevelopment activities might be carried
on under the Act, or, in other words, that they were left free to
make the law which was to be administered by them.
In 1947 Illinois adopted legislation which embraced the plan of
land assembly and clearance by public authority. In a test case
the statute authorizing the creation of municipal land clearance
commissions was upheld against four constitutional objections of
no crucial significance to urban redevelopment. 19
PROVISIONS or T-E Orno ACT
The Act is obviously grounded on the assumption that the home
rule grant to municipalities, made by Section 3 of Article XVIII
of the Constitution, is not adequate for present purposes. The
statute, at the same time, serves to subject municipal action to state
policy as to both powers and procedures. Is urban redevelopment
so far a state concern as to support this assertion of legislative
supremacy over municipalities? 20
The act applies solely to cities, that is, municipalities of 5,000
or more population. H.B. 195 originally extended to all municipal-
ities and also to counties and townships. The acute need for re-
development is to be found in the larger cities but it was necessary
to make the statute applicable to all cities since the constitutional
classification of municipalities into villages and cities is, for present
18 An area might be chosen for redevelopment which was "blighted be-
cause of the unsafe, unsanitary, inadequate or over-crowded condition of the
dwellings therein, or because of inadequate planning of the area, or excessive
land coverage by the buildings thereon, or the lack of proper light and air
and open space, or because of the defective design and arrangement of the
buildings thereon, or faulty street or lot layout, or economically or socially
undesirable land uses." PA. STATs. AxN., § 1702(a) (Purdon, 1949).
19 People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 399 IMI. 551, 78 N.. 2d 285
(1948).
20 See Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice,
9 Omo ST. L. 3. 18, 34-38, 61-66 (1948).
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purposes,21 exclusive. Authority is conferred in relation to blighted
areas within the corporate limits of a city. There is no extrater-
ritoriality. Nor is there any provision for inter-local co-operation.
Thus, the act does not cover peripheral blight as in an ill-conceived
or ill-developed subdivision, nor does it facilitate co-operation with
other local units such as a Metropolitan Housing Authority.
1. Administration
Unlike the plans which exist in some states, the Ohio statute
does not provide for the organization of separate ad hoc units of
government to administer redevelopment programs. The act con-
fers powers upon the city and leaves policy matters in the hands
of the city governing body, which may, in turn, designate an exist-
ing office, department, division, commission or agency of the city
as the "department" to perform the executive and managerial func-
tions under the act or establish a new one for the purpose. The act
contemplates the employment of a city planning commission, es-
tablished under the general law or by home rule charter, to per-
form general and redevelopment planning functions.
2. Powers Conferred
There is but one basic grant of primary authority in the Act.
Section 2 authorizes a city to acquire real property in a develop-
ment area, to clear or otherwise prepare it for redevelopment and
to sell or exchange it for purposes of redevelopment in accordance
with a development plan. The method of acquisition may be pur-
chase, gift, devise, exchange or appropriation (eminent domain).
The statute does not grant power to lease property for redevelop-
ment. It does confer incidental authority to lease for any uses
deemed desirable during the period of development of a project.
The statute defines a development plan as a plan for redevelop-
ment of all or part of a blighted area and a development area as
the portion of a blighted area to which a development plan applies.
There is a fixed four-acre minimum. The definition of "blighted
area" involves both (1) a majority of the structures in an area be-
ing affected by overcrowding or other blight elements and (2) non-
conformity of a majority of the structures in the area, in one or
more respects, with the building code or the ordinances relating to
safety, health or sanitation. While the emphasis here seems to be
laid upon the character and condition of structures the wording is
literally broad enough to cover a predominantly open area which
had, for example, been poorly and prematurely platted, as well as
slum areas. There is a practical question whether the second factor
2 1 City of Mansfield v. Endly, 38 Ohio App. 528 (1931), affd 124 Ohio St.
652, 181 N.E. 886 (1931); City of Elyria v. Vandemark, 100 Ohio St. 365, 126 N.E.
314 (1919).
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can ordinarily be made out even though serious blight exists. Much
depends on the mbaning of the words "fails to conform." A pro-
spective zoning ordinance permits the continuance of existing non-
conforming uses. If that type of non-conformity is intended per-
haps statutory "blight" could usually be established where actual
blight existed.
Section 9 authorizes a city to sell, exchange or otherwise trans-
fer any real property acquired under the act to public bodies for
use in accordance with the development plan. The remaining prop-
erty, which, under a plan, is to be devoted to other uses, must be
sold or exchanged by the city. Section 3 contemplates that a plan
designate public as well as private land uses proposed for the de-
velopment area. Obviously new streets as well as squares and rec-
reational areas may be desired. How can the city provide them
consistently with Section 9?
The ancillary power of eminent domain is granted with respect
to any real property not owned by the state or by the United States.
An unusual feature of the Ohio legislation is a provision for
agreements with owners of land in a development area to conform
their property and its use to the development plan, or if already
in conformity, to keep it that way. Planning commission approval
is required. Land covered by such an agreement may not be ap-
propriated by the city for purposes of the act, unless the owner
fails to keep his agreement.
3. The Planning Phase
Planned rehabilitation is a core idea in urban redevelopment.
The Ohio Act requires certain planning steps as conditions to the
exercise of the powers granted. There must be a general plan of
the city adopted by the city planning commission. The act defines
the general plan as a broad and general guide and pattern for fu-
ture city growth and development, which must be reduced to maps,
plats and charts and supported by data and descriptive and in-
terpretive analytical matter. The term "master plan" familiar to
planning law and practice, is not used, nor is there the specification
which appears in some urban redevelopment laws. Thus, under the
California Act, there must be a master plan or a general community
plan which includes, at the minimum, (1) the general location and
extent of the existing and proposed major thoroughfares, trans-
portation routes and other major public utilities and facilities, (2)
a land use plan which designates the proposed general distribution
and location as well as extent of public and private land uses and
(3) a statement of the standards of population density, building
intensity recommended in and for the various districts together
with estimates of population growth within the territory covered
[Vol. 10
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by the plan.2 2 The question as to the Ohio requirement is whether
it is definite enough to mean much.
There must be a plan adopted by the planning commission show-
ing the co-ordination of the development plan with the proposed
future development of the territory surrounding the development
area or the co-ordination with the present development, if no future
development is planned.
It is required that there be a development plan for the rede-
velopment of a proposed development area showing, by map, plat,
or chart, the limits of the area and designating the location, char-
acter and extent of land ownership and uses "such as street, sewer,
public transportation, school, recreation, dwelling, business, indus-
try." It may prove significant that the plan need not be specific
as to types of industrial uses, for example.
4. The Housing Nexus
The Act contemplates broad-gauged redevelopment for any
appropriate use, not simply residential slum clearance or rehabili-
tation for residential purposes. In order, however, to protect "dis-
placed families" the city council must, as a preliminary step, make
a finding that (1) there is a feasible method for their temporary
relocation and (2) there are or are being provided, in the develop-
ment area or other areas not less desirable as to public, public
utility and commercial facilities and at a cost the displaced fami-
lies can afford, decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for them. The
city must reimburse all occupants for their reasonable moving ex-
pense. This applies, presumably, to owner occupants as well as
tenants, but not, in view of the context, to non-residential occu-
pants.
The Housing Act of 1949 conditions Federal aid for redevelop-
ment upon provision being made for displaced families. It reads, in
this respect, much like the Ohio Act except that it does not require
reimbursement for moving expenses but exacts that the "new"
housing be reasonably accessible to the places of employment of
those displaced.23 The Federal Act, moreover, stipulates that there
shall be no demolition of residential structures prior to July 11,
1951, if the local governing body determines that it would reason-
ably be expected to create undue housing hardship. More important
is the fact that, except for areas predominantly residential in char-
acter, Federal aid may be extended only for redevelopment for
predominantly residential uses.2 4 These provisions are faithful to
the House Committee thesis that the primary justification for Fed-
2 2 DEpumG's CAtw. GE.N. LAws, Act. 1500, § 20.
2 3 PuBLic LAw 170, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., § 105 (c).
24Jbi § 110 (b).
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eral assistance is the improvement of housing conditions for urban
families.2
5
Neither the Ohio act nor the Federal Housing Act of 1949 lay
down any conditions or restrictions designed to prevent race dis-
crimination in redevelopment housing. Would such discrimination
by a private developer so far involve governmental action as to
constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws to persons de-
nied housing on racial grounds ?26
5. Redevelopment Procedure
1. The city council, prior to determining that an area is blighted,
prior to adopting a development plan and prior to making a pro-
tective finding as to displaced families, must hold not less than two
public hearings "thereon" at which all persons interested are af-
forded an opportunity to be heard. Presumably "thereon" refers
to all three matters previously mentioned. Notice must be given by
newspaper publication and, with respect to the first hearing, by
mailing to the last known owner of each parcel of land on the area.
Non-receipt of a copy is not an invalidating circumstance.
2. The next step is council determination that an area is blighted
and adoption of the development plan. Both must be by majority
vote of all "elected or appointed" members. (Does this refer to
total council seats or are vacant seats excluded?)27
3. Conformity agreements are made with landowners who pro-
pose to take the responsibility of effecting or maintaining conform-
ity with the plan.
4. The "department" administering the act next makes or ob-
tains appraisals of all real property in the area subject to appropri-
ation under the act. Appraisals are open to public inspection and
serve simply as guides in buying the property.
5. The department makes or obtains an estimate of the cost of
clearing or otherwise preparing the area in keeping with the plan.
6. The department certifies to council an estimate of the total
cost required of the city for the redevelopment as a guide to coun-
cil in providing funds. There is no specific reference here to the
cost of clearing but it is embraced within the generality of the pro-
vision.
25 Report fr m the Committee on Banking and Currency to accompany
H.R. 4009, H.R. REP. No. 590, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1949).
26 The New York Court of Appeals has, by a four-to-three vote, rejected
this constitutional objection as to the Stuyvesant Town project in New York
City which was constructed by Metropolitan Life under the earlier type of
redevelopment law with a twenty-five year tax exemption to the extent of
value added by the project. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, 87 N..
2d 541 (N. Y. 1949).




7. The city acquires and clears or otherwise prepares for de-
velopment the property in the area not covered by conformity
agreements nor owned by the United States or the state.
8. Property not transferred to other public bodies must be sold
or exchanged within six years after the adoption of the develop-
ment plan. The court of common pleas of the county may, however,
upon written application extend the period for a maximum of five
more years. No standard is provided to guide the court in the
exercise of this discretion.28 The city is required to obtain, prior to
sale or exchange, independent appraisals based upon the new uses
established under the plan. Transfer is made at fair value based
on those uses. Instead of public bidding the law exacts that council
hold a public hearing upon a proposed sale or exchange and ap-
prove it by a majority vote of all members appointed or elected to
the body.20 Council may impose conditions by zoning ordinance
or otherwise.
9. Section 10 is designed to permit modification of a develop-
ment plan. It first authorizes modification if written application is
made to the planning commission before the city has disposed of
any real property in the area. (A hearing must be held before coun-
cil may adopt a modification.) Then it provides that if the city has
sold or exchanged property to which a proposed modification re-
lates the council shall have no authority to modify the plan without
the written consent of the owner! This does not "jell" with the first
part of the section.
6. Financing - Federal Aid
Administrative expenses may be included in the city's annual
operating budget.
Both current and capital costs in connection with streets, side-
walks, and gutters may be paid from gasoline tax funds and motor
vehicle revenues allocated by the state to the city.
Project costs may be met by resort to general tax revenues and
by issuing general obligation bonds under the Uniform Bond Act.
Authority for special assessment financing was eliminated from the
bill before final enactment.
A bond issue for redevelopment must be approved by not less
than fifty-five per centum of the electors voting thereon at the next
November election to be held more than sixty days after the adop-
tion of the development plan. The act relaxes the initial and maxi-
mum maturity requirements of the Uniform Bond Act and permits
the issuance of bonds up to two per centum of taxable values with-
out regard to the general (5%) debt limitation. The proceeds of
28 Does this impose non-judicial business upon the court?
29 Section 105 (d) of the Housing Act of 1949 exacts such a hearing.
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property acquired and sold under the act constitute a retirement
fund for payment of principal of bonds issued pursuant to the act.
Does this mean that proceeds of sale in project A may be used to
pay bonds issued to finance project B?
There is no provision in the act for revenue bonds or for mort-
gaging property acquired by a city for redevelopment.
The Housing Act of 1949 authorizes temporary and definitive
loans to local public agencies to cover the capital costs of land as-
sembly and clearance.8 0
Since it is a fundamental assumption of the Ohio type of rede-
velopment law that the difference between the cost of land as-
sembly and clearance and the use value of property for redevelop-
ment will be absorbed by the city, Federal aid may prove to be a
vital factor in a given redevelopment project. The Housing Act of
1949 authorizes the Government to make grants covering two-thirds
of this difference.81 The local unit may provide its one-third in cash
value of land acquired for the project, in land clearance work or
site improvement or in public improvements in the area which are
primarily of direct benefit to the project and necessary for the new
land uses.
The Ohio Act authorizes cities to accept "advances or loans"
from the Federal Government and "gifts and grants" for purposes
of the act It says nothing about submitting to conditions which
the Government may exact. Would this make any difference so
long as the conditions did not require action in excess of city powers
under other provisions of the state act?
In determining costs a city must take into account damages to
public utility and common carrier systems incident to redevelop-
ment. Section 7 of the act requires compensation for damages to
such facilities involving the necessity of relocation or other sub-
stantial changes subject to a deduction in the amount of the net
value to the owner of direct and special benefits arising from the
changes.
7. Safeguards to Assure Effectuation of Plan
After adoption of a development plan a building permit for con-
struction in the area may be issued only upon written approval of
the planning commission based on a finding that the construction
would not be inconsistent with the plan. This approval is dispensed
with where the work is necessary for the immediate protection of
the public health or safety. Nothing is said as to who determines
necessity nor as to possible judicial review. Since the exception is
expressed in this way without reference to the authority which
30 Section 102 (a).
8 1 Sections 103 and 104.
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determines necessity it is likely that the courts would consider
"necessity" a matter of law for their ultimate determination.
With respect to assurances that private developers will carry
through within a reasonable time span and in accordance -with the
plan the act is extremely meager. It simply provides that sale or
exchange by a city shall be pursuant to such terms and conditions
as council may fix by zoning ordinances or otherwise. Doubtless
this is broad enough to enable a city to exact ample assurances as
by convenants or restrictions in deeds or by separate contracts, but
it is merely permissive. It is in sharp contrast with the Pennsyl-
vania Act, which has substantial minimur requirements in this
respect.32
8. Separability
The act does not have a separability clause. Perhaps the drafts-
men were relying upon Section 26-2 of the General Code, added in
1947. That section purports to make every section and part of a
section of the Code separable so that if any section or part of a
section were to be declared unconstitutional, void or ineffective the
remainder should be unaffected. Will the courts take a "code-wide"
separability clause seriously? Does it mean that every subsequent
enactment of a general and permanent character will be deemed
to have been made with reference to the clause in the absence of
an express provision to the contrary?
J.B.F.
32 PA. STATS. ANN., § 1711 (Purdon, 1949).
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